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AppendixA. Comparison of the Early
American and British Merger Movements
The United States and Great Britain experienced almost simul-
taneous early merger waves. In neither country was there evidence
of a merger movement of major proportions before the last decade
and one-half of the nineteenth century.' Both were leading
capitalist countries, in which the free market system was the prin-
cipal organizer of economic activity. This similarity prompts a look
at developments in Great Britain as clues to causes of the American
merger movement.
The data on the British merger movement are much less
detailed, and probably less reliable, than those for the United
States. The source used here is The Trust Movement in British
Industry, by H. W. Macrosty.2 Macrosty focussed attention on only
the more important mergers, and it is uncertain whether these were
fully reported. While probably providing a fairly valid picture of
the outlines of the movement, the detailed breakdowns by trend
and industry are less reliable. However, the study appeared to be
sufficiently large for use in making crude testsmerger theories.
The time patterns of mergers in the two countries are presented
in Chart A-i. Both Great Britain and the United States experi-
enced bursts of merger activity at the turn of the century, preceded
in each case by a smaller flurry of merger activity about ten years
earlier. In both countries the consolidation (or amalgamation) was
apparently the major form of merger activity throughout this
period.
Mergers and Industry Growth Rates
The pattern of industry growth and merger activity in the
United States was examined in detail in Chapter 4. It was found
that merger movements tended to occur when the growth of the
general economy, especially the growth of industries of high merger
activity, was characterized by acceleration rather than retardation.
The average annual rates of growth in industrial production by
decades for both countries are presented in Table A-i. Five-year
moving averages of the two series were computed to smooth the
IShannon,in his study of English limited liability companies, indicates no large
increase in sales and amalgamations of limited companies until the late 1880's and 1890's.
H. A. Shannon, "The Limited Companies of 1866—1883," Economic History Review, 1933,





Annual Percentage Rates of Growth in Industrial Production, United States and Great
Britain, by Overlapping Decades, 1870—1925
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Based on Indexes of industrial for the United States, from W. M. Persons,
Forecnsting Business Cycles, Wiley, 1931, Table 12, pp. 170-171; for Great Britain, from
W. G. Hoffman, British Industry, 1700—1950, translated by W. 0. Henderson and W. H.
Chaloner, London, Blackweli, 1955, Table 54, Part B, p. 332.
annual data. The average annual rate of growth for a given decade
was obtained by use of the compound interest formula. Through-
out the period 1870—1925 British industrial growth was substan-
tially lower than that of the United States. If we were to assume
that a merger movement results from an abrupt retardation in
high growth rates, as some have claimed for the United States, we
would expect the British merger movement to have occurred much
earlier in British industrial development than it did, perhaps as
early as the 1840's. Since the rate of growth was much lower by
1900, the impact of retardation may have been less; British indus-
try had had time to become adjusted to an economy of low growth
rates.
Apart from that qualification, Table A-i shows that, in both
countries, the three overlapping decades 1885—1895, 1890—1900,
and 1895—1905 were characterized by increasing rates of industrial
growth. It was not until well after the merger movements in both
countries that retardation was resumed.
GROWTH RATES OF IMPORTANT MERGER INDUSTRIES
Table A-2 gives a list of important British merger industries
-. compiledfrom the data presented by Macrosty. Also available are
production series relevant to several of these industries,3 permitting
us to examine the growth pattern of specific high-merger industries.
W. G. Hoffman, British Industry, 1700-1950, translated by W. 0. Henderson and
W. H. Chaloner, London, Biackwell, 1955, Table 54, Part B.
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TABLE A-2









Mineral extraction 18 138
Iron and steel 29 94




Source: H. W. Macrosty, The Trust Movement in British Indusfr,, London, Longmans,
1907.
The average growth rates of the several series are presented in
Table A-S. The picture is mixed. Two of the four industries ex-
hibited sustained acceleration in the period 1885—1905, while two
exhibited retardation. If a comprehensive production series had
been available for chemicals, one suspects it would have shown
acceleration, perhaps tipping the balance in favor of acceleration.
The growth-retardation—merger hypothesis, briefly examined in
the light of British experience, seems weak on two counts. First,
it fails to explain why Great Britain had a merger movement as
late as 1900, when retardation by that time had apparently become
TABLE A-3









1870—1880 2.1 3.3 1.5 1.5
1875—1885 0.8 3.3 0.1 0.8
1880—1890 1.8 2.8 1.3 1.6
1885—1895 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.3
1890—1900 0.8 2.3 2.2 2.5
1895—1905 0.8 3.2 0.1 2.7
1900—1910 4.8 1.6 —1.4 2.2
1905—1915 2.2 1.7 —0.8 2.0
1910—1920 —1.1 —1.2 —3.0 0.4
1915-1925 —3.4 —2.3 —2.8 2.7
Number of series 4 2 3 1
Source: Hoffman, British Industry, 1700—1950, Table 54, Part B.
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a long-established pattern. Second, the balance of evidence is
slightly in favor of the thesis that mergers were a more common
feature of industries undergoing growth acceleration.
TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENT AND MERGERS
The patterns of transportation growth in England and the
United States were quite different. By 1900 the British railway net
had been long achieved, while that of the United States was just
reaching full development.4 This is reflected in differences in the
rates of growth of railroad freight haulage in the two countries
(Table A-4). In addition, the geographical concentration of British
TABLE A-4
Annual Percentage Rates of Growth, Railroad Freight Haulage,
United States and Great Britain, 1885—1910





a Based on ton-miles data.
bBasedon tons of freight hauled.
Source: for the United States, Historical Statistics of the Unitcd States, 1789—1945, Bureau
of the Census, 1949; for Great Britain, Hoffman, British Industry, 1700—1950, Table 54,
Part B.
industry was necessarily much higher than that of the United
States. The area east of the Mississippi River alone was almost ten
times that of Great Britain. It therefore seems unlikely that the
low rate of British railroad growth in the late nineteenth century
was responsible for the destruction of isolated local monopolies
with a consequent increase in the need to merge. Such a force, if
operating, probably would have been greatest at a much earlier
date.
Developments in the tariff, a factor in the effect of international
transportation changes on the competitive positions of industries,
seem to nave taken divergent courses in the two countries. British
industry, which had operated under a policy of free trade for
decades, continued to do so through the period of high merger
activity. United States industry, on the other hand, had long been
4Thedevelopment of the pre-railroad network of canals in Great Britain also preceded
that of the United States. The Manchester—Liverpool canal was completed in 1772;
the Erie Canal, in 1825.
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operating under a policy of protection, enhanced in the late 1900's
by a series of almost uninterrupted tariff increase from 1883 to
It was not until the Underwood Act of 1913 that a reduction
in tariffs was enacted. The American argument that "the tariff was
the mother of the trusts" thus receives little support from the
experience.
Mergers and the Capital Market
The relationship between the capital market and the early
merger wave in the United States was examined in detail in
Chapter 4. The evidence suggested that the capital market played
a central role in the merger movement. The organized securities
exchanges underwent important quantitative and qualitative
gTowth in Lhe years preceding and during the merger movement.
Many consolidations used the organized exchanges to market their
securities, and merger activity responded more sensitively to
changes in stock prices than to changes in industrial production.
No series could be found on the volume of trading on the organ-
ized British securities exchanges, or on other magnitudes relating
to their ability to handle the large securities issues accompanying
the wave of amalgamations at the end .of the century. However,
there are several historical reasons for believing that the British
capital market had attained maturity before that of the United
States. Among them is the head start in general industrial growth
enjoyed by Great Britain, with the necessary development of
financial institutions for gathering and allocating capital. The ex-
port of large amounts of capital to the United States in the middle
and late nineteenth century further reflected the existence of an
organized system for marshalling capital. Finally, as the financial
center for a vast nineteenth-century colonial empire, the British
Isles probably nurtured the growth of financial institutions beyond
what was needed for strictly domestic purposes. We may say with
reasonable assurance that the capital market, by the end of the
nineteenth century, was adequate to support a large merger wave.
The early development of the British capital market tends to
rule it out as an immediate cause of the merger movement. In this
respect the British experience differs from that of the United States.
However, a limited examination of the relationship between
mergers and stock prices indicates that British merger activity
responded in a positive fashion to capital market conditions. Table
8SeeF. W. Taussig, The History of the United States, Putnam, 1931.
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A-5 gives the results of correlating the number of firms disappear-
ing annually into amalgamations with the securities quotation
index and the industrial production index for the nineteen-year
period of high British merger activity, 1886—1904.
TABLE A-5
Relationship of Merger Activity to Stock Prices and Industrial Production, Great Britain,





Coefficients of simple correlation between—
Mergers and securities prices + 0.550 + 0.613
Mergers and industrial production + 0.530 + 0.259
Securities prices and industrial production + 0.939 + 0.659
Coefficients of partial correlation between—
Mergers and securities prices, after allowing for
changes in industrial production ÷ 0.178 + 0.608
Mergers and industrial production, after allowing
for changes in stock prices + 0.049 —0.243
Source: Annual series on merger disappearances in Great Britain, Macrosty, The
Trust Movement in British Industry; on security quotations and industrial production index,
Hoffman, British Industry, 1700-1950. The coefficients for the United States are based on
quarterly series in Tables B-i, B-2, and C-7, below.
The correlation coefficients indicate that British merger activity
wasslightlymore responsive to changes in stock prices than to
changes inindustrial production. But, since the correlation
between stock prices and industrial production is very high, the
separate effect of these two variables cannot be demonstrated as
clearly for Great Britain as it was for the United States. In any case,
the British experience seems to have been similar in general out-
line to that of the United States, and the findings tend to support
the hypothesis that the capital market played an important role
in the early merger movement in this country. This supplementary
evidence based upon a necessarily crude analysis can only be forti-
fied by more detailed examinations of the British experience, yet
to be made.
Judicial Interpretation of Antitrust Legislation
A frequent explanation of the early merger wave in the United
States is that combination by merger was the only legal way to con-
trol competition. Two leading Supreme Court decisions are usually
cited to show that the Courts interpreted the section of the Sher-
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man Act6 prohibiting themonopolizationof an industry (section 2)
very narrowly, while they interpreted the section prohibiting con-
spiracies in restraint of trade (section 1) very broadly. The narrow
interpretation of section 2 was made in 1895 in the Knight decision,
five years after the passage of the Sherman Act.7 The broader inter-
pretation of section 1 came in 1899 in the Addyston Pipe decision.8
It is argued that these decisions informed businessmen that loose-
knit associations—pools and cartels—would receive harsh Court
treatment, and that mergers would receive lenient Court treat-
ment.
The timing of the Court decisions does not fit this hypothesis
very well. The anticonspiracy Addyston decision was not made
until 1899, after many consolidations had been consummated.
However, the Circuit Court decision of William Howard Taft,
which may have been regarded as definitive even though appealed
to the Supreme Court, was made on February 8, Two other
anticonspiracy decisions that may have been regarded as setting the
precedent also occurred in the initial of the large merger
wave." The picture is therefore mixed. Certainly the timing of
Court decisions is not clear enough to permit a simple cause-and-
effect explanation of the switch from pools and cartels to mergers
as the leading device for securing market control. It also fails to
explain the brief flurry of mergers in 1888—1892.
The leading English antitrust decision of this period was the
Mogul decision of December 1891." England had no statutory pro-
visions for dealing with the monopoly problem. 'The decision was
an interpretation of the English common law regarding conspira-
cies in restraint of trade. The Mogul Steamship Company sued a
combination of shipping companies for damages to Mogul by
rebates offered shippers confining their shipments of Hankow tea
exclusively to the conspiring companies. Judgement was given
unanimously against the Mogul Company. In effect, the decision
made such conspiracies in restraint more permissible rather than
less.
Opinion differs as to the degree to which the Mogul decision
represented a departure from the English common law tradition
6 An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies,
July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. L. 209.
'United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
8 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
8 Addystori Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 271, Federal Reporter, April—May 1898.
10 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
11 Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Dow and Co., 1892, A.C. 25.
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of hostility toward such conspiracies. One view is that it repre-
sented a sharp break with the tradition.12 Another view is that it
was only one, though an important one, of a series of decisions that
had been progressively modifying that hostility.'3 Whether a sharp
or gradual break from tradition, the interpretation of the English
courts ran counter to the anti-conspiracy decisions of the American
Courts. This lends scant support to the hypothesis that, in the
United States, judicial interpretation shaped the pattern of indus-
trial combination.
Corporation Law Changes
The liberalization of the corporation laws of certain states in the
late 1880's and 1890's has been offered as one of the proximate
causes of the United States merger movement.'4 These changes in-
cluded more lenient provisions for obtaining charters from cor-
poration commissions, lifting of narrow restrictions on lines of
business permitted, raising limits on authorized capitalization, and
permission for a corporation to own the stock of another corpora-
tion. Without this permissive legislation, it is argued, a widespread
merger movement would have been prevented.
The major development in English law bearing on the freedom
and size of corporations was the granting of general limited liability
to ordinary trading and manufacturing companies by act of Parlia-
ment. In addition to introducing a general limited liability, the
acts did away with many of the regulatory provisions that had
characterized earlier corporation laws.'5 It was an abrupt change in
English law comparable to the later liberalizations in American
law achieved when New Jersey and Delaware began the competi-
tion for incorporating business enterprises.
The English Limited Liability Act was passed in 1855, and
repealed and further liberalized in the Joint Stock Companies Act
of 1856. These laws were followed almost immediately by a large
increase in the number of incorporations. Between 1844 and 1855,
12 F. H. Levy, "A Contrast Between the Antitrust Laws of Foreign Countries and of the
United States," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 1930,
p. 128.
13 Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, Origination of An American Tradition,
Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 27—35.
George J. Stigler, "Monopo'y and Oligopoly by Merger" Papers and Proceedings of the
American Economic Association, May 1950, PP. 27—3 1.
15 H. A. Shannon, "The Coming of General Limited Liability," Economic History
Review, 1931, reprinted in Essays in Economic History, op. cit., p. 378.
136APPEXDIX A
966 unlimited liability companies registered under the Registra-
tion Act of 1844. The total number of limited liability companies
registered between 1856 and 1862 was 2479.16 Table A-6 shows an
unbroken increase in incorporations from the 1860's into the
1930's (where the data ends).
TABLE A-6
Number of Business Incorporations in the United Kingdom













Source: Shannon, "The Limited Companies of 1866—1883," P. 382; George H. Evans,
Jr., Business Incorporations in the United States, 1800—1943, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1948, Table 14, p. 35.
The forty-odd year lag between the limited liability acts of
1855—18 56 and the turn-of-the-century merger movement disquali-
fies the acts as immediate causes of the merger wave. During this
period, moreover, there were no further major liberalizations of
the law that would drastically ease the regulation of corporations.
The law was made sufficiently liberal in its first enactment.
There were, however, important qualitative changes in the use
of limited liability charters in the years from 1856 until shortly
before the merger wave. In the years immediately following the
1855—1856 acts, high par-value shares were commonly issued,
partially paid-up, and with promises not to call for the remainder
of the subscription. Arrangements like these, commonly with only
a few investors, amounted largely to a continuation of the un-
limited liability partnership organization which had traditionally
characterized English business. In the 1880's, the more common
form of limited liability share arrangement was low par value, fully
paid up, and many investors. As in the modern large corporation,
the investors' liability was truly limited to the amount of the
16Ibid.,p. 379.
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original investment, and ownership was more fully divorced from
control.'1
The British corporate law experience, as a guide to causes of
the United States merger movement, presents a mixed picture.
The necessary legislative changes took place some forty years before
the merger wave; but apparently it took nearly that long to change
the manner of business operation and financing to realize fully the
potentialities of limited liability. Business in the United States
had also operated under limited liability laws for an extended
period, so that by tradition and experience it was prepared to
exploit the liberalized features of the acts of the 1880's and 1890's.
These features, in effect, had existed in British law since 1856.
If, as is likely, the unlimited liability partnership tradition was not
as strong in the United States as in Britain, it seems probable that
the United States would have experienced an earlier rise in merger
activity if corporation laws had been made more lenient at an
earlier date. This is largely conjectural, however, and must await
more definitive studies for a final answer.
17Thisparagraph draws ahnost upon J. B. Jeifreys' article, "The Denomin-
ation and Character of Shares, 1855—1885," Economic History Review, 1946, reprinted in
Essays in Economic History, op. cii., pp. 344—357.
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